Dichotomies in Philosophy: Tuesday, May 5th at 9:00 pm
It seems that many discussions in philosophy tend towards dichotomies. Realism vs. anti-realism in epistemology, objectivism vs subjectivism, realism vs. idealism, compatibilism vs. incompatibilism, and so forth. While by no means do all views fall into this categorization, it seems as if though many of these dichotomies are parallel Ð as if though all the latter views are more consistent with each other than with any of the former entries, and vice versa. In particular, there seems to be a tendency toward external versus internal truth in almost all subdisciplines. Is it possible there is some root intuition driving all of these dichotomies? Is there something more at play? Or is the distinction illusory?

Location: Tower Room, 1879 Hall.

Alexander Nehamas on Nietzsche: Sunday, May 3rd at 6:00 pm
For our last Sunday dinner of the semester, the Princeton Philosophical Society will be having a dinner this Sunday (May 3rd) with Alexander Nehamas. Nehamas, Edmund N. Carpenter II Class of 1943 Professor, has written groundbreaking works in ancient philosophy, Nietzsche studies, and aesthetics. His latest book, Only A Promise of Happiness, was called 2007's best scholarly book in philosophy by the Association of American Publishers, while his 1985 work on Nietzsche was called "the best and most important book on Nietzsche in English". Professor Nehamas is also universally beloved by his students, and has won several teaching awards through his career, including the University of Pennsylvania's highest teaching honor.

He will discuss the role of "perspectivism" in Nietzsche's philosophical thought, a view often described as the claim that "Every view is an interpretation." The question is often asked: Is perspectivism itself an interpretation or not? If not, then there is at least one view that is not an interpretation, and perspectivism refutes itself. If it is, then, since it is no more than an interpretation, there is no reason for us to believe it. Such considerations identify perspectivism with relativism, which claims that we have no right to speak of what is true about an issue but only of what is true for me (or for us) and is refuted in a similar way.

Is perspectivism is in fact a form of relativism? Do the refutations above in fact succeed? Professor Nehamas will argue that the answer to both is no, and that it is worth asking what the point of perspectivism could possibly be and what implications it may have for our knowledge of the world.

Location: Whitman College Private Dining Room.

Robert DiSalle on the "ineffective reasonableness of mathematics": Sunday, November 30th at 6:45 pm
We will having a special sushi dinner with visiting Professor Robert DiSalle. Professor DiSalle studies the history and philosophy of science, and specializes in the philosophical history of physics. His latest book, Understanding Space-Time, has been called "a unique and extremely valuable new addition to the philosophy of space-time physics."

DiSalle will discuss the what he calls the "ineffective reasonableness of mathematics", and its relationship to philosophical revolutions in natural science. Philosophers have traditionally puzzled over the "unreasonable effectiveness" of mathematical explanations of the physical world, but DiSalle wants to turn that observation on its head and focus on what happens when a mathematical scheme fails to explain the world. In such a case, progress depends on a philosophical revolution, that is, on a revolutionary philosophical analysis of the ways in which mathematical concepts connect with physical phenomena. An examination of these revolutions suggest novel ways of thinking about not only the relationship between mathematics and physics, but also between science and philosophy.

Location: Tower Room, 1879 Hall.

Philip Pettit on Freedom: Sunday, November 30th at 6:00 pm
Our Sunday dinner series continues with istinguished political philosopher Philip Pettit tonight. Professor Petitt is the Laurance S. Rockefeller University Professor; among other things, he has served as an advisor to the Spanish government on how political philosophy can inform policy-making.

Professor Petitt will discuss the concept of "freedom" in political philosophy, which serves as the foundation of his political theory of "republicanism".

Location: Whitman College Private Dining Room.

The Naturalist's Dilemma: Tuesday, April 7th at 6:00 pm
Philosophical naturalism has assumed an almost predominant role in our thought and discourse about metaphysics, science, and knowledge. We construct our worldviews around the explainable, observable, and rationally provable, and we demand a high standard of worldly evidence for virtually all of our beliefs. Since W.V.O. Quine's withering attack on logical positivism and the supposed disconnect between science and philosophy, philosophers have increasingly conducted themselves in the manner of scientists: proposing falsifiable hypothesis and seeking theories with explanatory power.

Yet there is a fundamental dissonance between our philosophical commitment to naturalism and our pre-philosophic beliefs about the world. On the one hand, we demand explanatory power and evidence; on the other hand, we instinctively believe in the existence of causally inert things (that is, things that don't impinge upon the natural world). Among other things, we believe in abstract objects, morality, mental substance, supernatural beings, and mind-independent truth Ð all of which are often claimed to have no physical substance or effect on the natural world.

Our knowledge of causally inert things poses troubling questions for all philosophers, not just naturalists, though the conflict there is most apparent. We would like to explore the nature of these things, and ask what implications their existence would hold. Do they even exist, or are they only apparently causally inert? How can we come to have knowledge of them if they do not impinge upon the natural world? Can we reconcile them with naturalism Ð and, if not, which do we believe more strongly in? If we accept them as real, is there any non-trivial philosophical work that can be done to describe them, or are they by nature completely elusive?

Location: Tower Room, 1879 Hall.

Peter Singer on Utilitarianism: Sunday, November 30th at 6:00 pm
Our Sunday dinner series continues with Professor Peter Singer, a world-renown moral philosopher who is one of the leading defenders of utilitarianism.

Professor Singer will be discussing the structure and nature of utilitarianism. What does it demand of us? What is the ideal form of it? What are its technical challenges? How can we be persuaded to become utilitarians? And many other matters.

Professor Singer has kindly provided us with two background readings, available here and here.

Location: Whitman College Private Dining Room.

Experimental Philosophy: Tuesday, November 24th at 9:00 pm
A popular recent development in philosophy is the use of psychological research to inform philosophical conclusions, particularly in moral philosophy. An especially influential player in this movement is Joshua Greene, who has used fMRI imaging to explore the brain activity present during moral reasoning.

Greene has advanced what he terms a 'dual process' view of moral reasoning. On this view, people use two different cognitive systems to arrive at moral decisions: one involving an immediate emotional response (a valenced system), the other involving calculation of situationally significant factors on the model of Descartes' 'pure reason' (a non-valenced system). He claims that when people reach conclusions based on consequentialist considerations, they are motivated by intellection. In cases where people go with response that is not obviously consequentialis, their intellect is overwhelmed by the emotional response.

Graduate student Rochelle Edinburg will join us to review Greene's findings. She will raise some problems with his experimental methods, and discuss some doubts about the possibility of making arguments about the reliability or choice-worthiness of certain types of moral reasoning based on fMRI or behavioral data.

Location: Tower Room, 1879 Hall.

Tom Kelly on Philosophical Radicalism: Sunday, November 16th at 6:00 pm
Our Sunday dinner series continues with Professor Thomas Kelly, a specialist in epistemology who was awarded membership in the Harvard Society of Fellows, considered the most exclusive and prestigious postgraduate fellowship in the country.

Professor Kelly will be discussing whether and to what extent it is rational for philosophical arguments to lead us to revise our ordinary, 'common sense' views about ontology, epistemology, and morality. Must we accept either the Moorean argument that common sense necessarily trumps philosophy or the Cartesian view that philosophy requires jettisoning our ordinary beliefs at the door, or is there a stable alternative? What distinguishes philosophical argument from other forms of argument that do seem to trump common sense (such as science)?

Professor Kelly has kindly provided us with a background reading, his own working paper on the topic, which may be found here.

Location: Whitman College Private Dining Room.

Gideon Rosen on Moral Responsibility: Sunday, October 27th at 6:00 pm
Our Sunday dinner series continues with Professor Gideon Rosen, who has previously been awarded the President's Award for Distinguished Teaching, Princeton's highest honor for teaching. Professor Rosen addressed us last year, and commented afterward that it was "a terrific discussion Ñ probably the best I've had with a group of undergraduates at Princeton or elsewhere."

Professor Rosen will start by talking about the moral significance of duress. We would like to identify and explain the conditions under which duress should be a legitimate excuse in morality and the law. As Rosa Brooks asks, "Is someone who kills the innocent in order to save his own life or the life of a family member morally blameworthy for his act? If not, is he merely excused (as he might be if he were temporarily insane), or is his act somehow justified or permissible?" If we ourselves are under duress, what are we to do about it and why?

He has kindly provided us with a background reading, which may be accessed here.

Location: Whitman College Octagonal Private Dining Room.

Self-Deception: Tuesday, October 7th at 9:00 pm
We frequently deceive ourselves about the state of the world: we accept beliefs in the face of strong evidence to the contrary, following our emotions and desires rather than epistemic merit. We do this in order to lie more effectively to others; to feel more confident and optimistic; and to escape unpleasant facts.

We'd like to explore this common practice from a philosophical point of view. We'd like to ask whether self-deception is intentional or non-intentional. What does it imply for our view of rationality -- and, indeed, our ability to even be rational? Perhaps most importantly, under what conditions (if any) should we be comfortable with self-deception?

An optional background reading may be found here.

Location: Tower Room, 1879 Hall.

Truth and Belief: Tuesday, September 23th at 9:00 pm
It seems apparent that one of the most important goals of philosophy is to discover truths about the world. Yet it also apparent that two fully rational individuals, given the same evidence, can properly draw two entirely different conclusions. So, for instance, Jones, who begins with weak beliefs in (a) the existence of god and (b) the conventional theory of cancer, justifiably interprets a series of a complete cancer remissions as evidence for the existence of god. Smith, meanwhile, who has weak beliefs that (a) god does not exist and (b) cancer can be cured by eating turnips grown under a certain planetary alignment, justifiably interprets these same remissions as evidence against the existence of god. They both reason correctly, yet the evidence leads them to radically different conclusions.

Thus, provided we each have different prior beliefs, it may be the case that no matter what evidence is shared among us, we will continue to disagree about the state of the world. To be sure, this is less of a problem for science, given the variety and specificity of empirical evidence available. However, this seems to be a major problem for philosophy. Debates over free will, the existence of objective morality, the existence of abstract objects, and so forth often turn more on our prior beliefs (intuitions) than upon the evidence brought to bear. It may, indeed, be the case that many problems in philosophy cannot be resolved -- that, after all the evidence is exhausted, we may justifiably maintain differing beliefs.

If we are right that fully informed and rational people can disagree, then the best philosophy might hope to do is ensure that our beliefs are self-consistent and consistent with the evidence. It will not ensure that our beliefs track the truth. Is this in fact the case? If it is, does it devalue the philosophical enterprise? What implications would it have for the way we discuss and debate philosophy? What implications would it have for the way we think about our beliefs? If we are able to extend it to cover every single belief we have, does that mean that we cannot privilege any of our beliefs as being stronger or more basic than the others?

A more formal treatment of the argument can be found here.

Location: Tower Room, 1879 Hall.

Michael Walzer on the Jewish Political Tradition: Sunday, April 27th at 6:00 pm
Our Sunday dinner series continues with Michael Walzer, of the Institute for Advanced Study, who has been called "our nation's preeminent living political philosopher" and was ranked one of the world's top public intellectuals by Prospect magazine.

He will discuss the Jewish Political Tradition, one of his enduring research projects. In particular, he'd like to use it as a jumping off platform for questions about intellectuals traditions in general. What is a tradition? How do we mark its boundaries? Who is in and who is out? What is the value of "traditional" discourse?

Location: Whitman College Octagonal Private Dining Room.

Cultural Relativism: Monday, April 21st at 9:00 pm
Cultural relativism is often taken as a given in academia. Propelled by findings of modern anthropology, it sometimes seems as if its only alternative is modern jingoism, nationalism, or an attitude of cultural superiority. But is this true? Are there general points of agreement which virtually all cultures share or should share? Or, rather, is the search for absolutes fruitless? And what of variation within a cultural itself? Can we distinguish between relativism about morality and relativism about other practices, or do we have to accept or reject relativism outright?

Location: Tower Room, 1879 Hall.

Robin Hanson on Economic Welfare and Morality: Monday, April 14th at 6:00 pm
We are pleased to present a special dinner with Robin Hanson, associate professor of economics at George Mason University, who specializes in the study of rationality and decision-making.

He will discuss the relationship between economic welfare and morality. Economists typically infer what people want from their choices, and then endorse policies expected to give everyone more of what they want. Philosophers often complain such policies are morally deficient, implicitly endorsing an implausible and crude version of utilitarianism. Professor Hanson will argue that what people want includes their moral considerations, and that he (and most of us) want policy to give us what we want, even if that is immoral.

Hanson sketches out his argument here. Background information can be found here.

No RSVP is necessary; students of all backgrounds are welcome! Please get your food from the serving area and then bring your trays into the PDR (there'll be a sign on the door). Note to juniors and seniors without a meal plan: you will have to use one of your two weekly meal passes to come to this event.

Location: Rockefeller College Private Dining Room.

Bas van Fraassen on Conflicts and Dilemmas: Sunday, April 13th at 6:00 pm
Our Sunday dinner series continues with Professor Bas van Fraassen, one of the world's preeminent epistemologists and the inaugural winner of the prestigious Lakatos Award for philosophy of science. Professor van Fraassen will be retiring at the end of the semester, so this is perhaps the last time to ever hear him speak.

He will discuss the reformative consequences of dilemmas and intellectual conflicts in both ethics and epistemology. In epistemology, we necessarily commit ourselves to particular worldviews which then structure our observations, beliefs, and theories. Yet these worldviews can be wrong. How can we make sense of accepting a new worldview when it is not a genuine option under our current one? In ethics, we sometimes face moral dilemmas; that is, there are times when we ought to do something and not do it. Such situations can motivate us to revise our moral beliefs, but the basis upon which we do so is unclear. Professor van Fraassen will examine each of these cases and then look for possible connections and parallels between them.

Background on moral dilemmas can be found here. Background on worldview change can be found here.

No RSVP is necessary; students of all backgrounds are welcome! Please get your food from the serving area and then bring your trays into the PDR (there'll be a sign on the door). Note to juniors and seniors without a meal plan: you will have to use one of your two weekly meal passes to come to this event.

Location: Whitman College Octagonal Private Dining Room.

Decision-Making Paradoxes: Tuesday, April 10th at 9:00 pm
Decision theory is the area in philosophy that studies how we ought to make rational decisions in light of our ends. Two notorious open problems in decision theory are Newcomb's problem and Kavka's toxin puzzle, each of which suggest that it might be 'rational' to be 'irrational'. We will examine each of these paradoxes in turn and consider what they have to say about rational judgement.

A brief overview of each problem may be found here (highly recommended).

Location: Tower Room, 1879 Hall.

John Gardner on Moral Luck: Sunday, April 6th at 6:00 pm
Our Sunday dinner series continues with Professor John Gardner, who is visiting Princeton this semester from Oxford University and is considered one of the world's leading legal philosophers. Professor Gardner will discuss the problem of outcome luck: that we judge actions differently based on how they turn out, rather than simply on intent. A familiar instance of the problem is found in the distinction drawn in most legal systems between attempted crimes (such as attempted murder) and their completed counterparts (such as murder). He will discuss whether there is an authentically moral explanation for the disparate treatment -- whether completed wrongs and attempted wrongs are morally distinct -- or whether such differentiation is merely prudential.

Further background information can be found here.

No RSVP is necessary; students of all backgrounds are welcome! Please get your food from the serving area and then bring your trays into the PDR (there'll be a sign on the door). Note to juniors and seniors without a meal plan: you will have to use one of your two weekly meal passes to come to this event.

Location: Whitman College Octagonal Private Dining Room.

Gideon Rosen on Philosophy of Mathematics: Sunday, March 30th at 6:00 pm
Our Sunday dinner series continues with Professor Gideon Rosen, a specialist in metaphysics who has previously been awarded the President's Award for Distinguished Teaching, Princeton's highest honor for teaching. Professor Rosen will talk about the philosophy of mathematics and why it matters. He'll present a "knock down" argument for Platonism, the view that non-physical, non-mental abstract objects exist, and then discuss the implications of this for metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language. The material is completely non-technical, so knowing basic arithmetic will suffice for understanding the argument.

Professor Rosen has kindly provided a background reading, "On What There Is" by WVO Quine.

No RSVP is necessary; students of all backgrounds are welcome! Please get your food from the serving area and then bring your trays into the PDR (there'll be a sign on the door). Note to juniors and seniors without a meal plan: you will have to use one of your two weekly meal passes to come to this event.

Location: Whitman College Octagonal Private Dining Room.

Sarah McGrath on Moral Disagreement: Sunday, March 9th at 6:00 pm
The inaugural speaker for our new Sunday dinner series will be Professor Sarah McGrath, a specialist in moral philosophy and metaphysics. Professor McGrath will discuss the the epistemic problem of moral disagreement: even if some moral facts exist, how can we ever determine what they are given the extensive degree of moral variation in the world? Are we justified in holding idiosyncratic moral values even if they are widely rejected? If half of us believe that fetuses have moral rights and half of us do not, how are we to decide who is correct? How does the moral case relate to the general problem of epistemological disagreement?

A concise summary of the basic problem can be found here. A more detailed treatment may be found here.

No RSVP is necessary; students of all backgrounds are welcome! Please get your food from the serving area and then bring your trays into the PDR (there'll be a sign on the door). Note to juniors and seniors without a meal plan: you will have to use one of your two weekly meal passes to come to this event.

Location: Whitman College Octagonal Private Dining Room.

Justice and Revenge: Tuesday, February 26th at 9:15 pm
What is justice? What is revenge? Is there a difference? Why is justice generally acceptable and revenge unacceptable? Can we define a norm that validly distinguishes between justice and revenge? Or are "justice" and "revenge" merely artificial terms we use for convenience according to our subjective beliefs?

No formal philosophical knowledge required; students of all backgrounds ware welcome.

Location: Tower Room, 1879 Hall.

Personal Identity: Tuesday, February 12th at 9:00 pm
How do we define ourselves? What separates us from the external world? Will we be the same people ten years from now as we are now? Should the contracts we make at this moment bind us in the future (that is to say, should our present selves be allowed to bind our future selves). In considering action, must we consider the 'interests' of our future selves as being distinct from our own, or are the interests of our present selves indistinguishable from the interests of our future selves.

This is a subject with broad ramifications across both metaphysics and moral philosophy and troubling implications. For example, a consideration of identity leads some philosophers to compositional nihilism -- the notion that only 'simples' of matter, like electrons and quarks, exist, while 'objects' in the ordinary sense of the word (including people) do not exist. Peter Unger famously wrote a defense of this notion with the clever title "I Do Not Exist".

Location: Tower Room, 1879 Hall.

Pleasure, Pain, and Life's Purpose: Monday, December 17th at 9:00 pm
Normative hedonism is a moral doctrine which argues that seeking pleasure and avoiding pain should be the only ends in life. Many normative hedonists would further contend that -- considering evolutionary history and practical experience -- this doctrine underlies what most people believe. Rules simply exist to advance the pleasure-pain principle and should be discarded when they don't. Is this doctrine valid? Is it implicitly accepted by such a broad audience? Can inconsistencies in intuitive moral thought be reconciled by adopting it? Why shouldn't we adopt it and how strong are the arguments for not doing so?

Students of all backgrounds are welcome; there is no prerequisite knowledge of philosophy.

Location: Frist 207. Highly recommended background reading.

Free Will and Its Critics: Tuesday, December 4th at 9:00 pm
The Princeton Philosophical Society will be holding a student discussion on free will and its critics. Questions at issue: what is free will? can our commonsense definition withstand scrutiny? is free will actually a relevant concept? is determinism compatible with free will? does indeterminism have very radical implications? can we even judge whether determinism or indeterminism are correct? does the 'truth' of free will matter to us?

Students of all backgrounds are welcome; there is no prerequisite knowledge of philosophy.

Location: Frist 114. Reading on free will.

The Ethics of War: Tuesday, November 20th at 9:00 pm
The Princeton Philosophical Society will be holding a student discussion on the ethics of war. Topics to include: what are the justified reasons for waging war? can war ever be just? are there such things as 'laws of war' and if so what should they be? is conflict an inherent part of the human condition or can it be eliminated? if it can be eliminated, should we eliminate it? at what cost?

Students of all backgrounds are welcome. There is no prerequisite knowledge of philosophy! Take note, however, that this discussion is not for the purposes of questioning whether current day wars such as the invasion Iraq are right or wrong. It is a discussion of the eternal and theoretical aspects of war and morality, which can permit but will by no means center on discussion of current events.

Location: Frist 307. Optional but useful background reading.