

*Adapted from "But I Could Be Wrong" by George Sher, Rice University.*

The epistemological problem of moral disagreement:

- (1) I often disagree with others about what I morally ought to do
- (2) The moral outlook that supports my current judgment about what I ought to do has been shaped by my upbringing and experiences. For (just about) any alternative judgment, there is some different upbringing and set of experiences that would have caused me to acquire a moral outlook that would in turn have supported that alternative judgment.

Therefore, we cannot have confidence that our own particular moral beliefs are correct. We have no advantage over others in perceiving moral truth, and others disagree with our normative conceptions, so we cannot say that our judgments are better or correct. Moreover, had our personal histories or natures been different, we would have developed different moral beliefs; our current beliefs are simply an accident of circumstance and luck. There seems to be no justification for rationally accepting or rejecting our inherent beliefs, so how can we possibly come to an understanding of moral truth?

Sher's solution: "given the inescapability of my commitment to acting for reasons", I should retain my own moral judgements. That is, since we can have no rational preferences over moral beliefs, we might as well select the path of least resistance and retain our own.